Friday, April 06, 2007

Bloody Iranians! They Almost Tortured Us...

The irony of torture is not so much that it is reprehensible (not to mention counterproductive), but rather that it can be employed by anyone... and, unfortunately, what's good (or rather bad) for the goose is good (bad) for the gander.

Yet, the international anger at the treatment of the 15 British servicemen and woman, is understandable. So when the "officer in charge Lt Carman said they were taken to a prison in Tehran where they were stripped and dressed in pyjamas", I couldn't help but understand their outrage.

And when, "Royal Marine Joe Tindell told how they feared for their lives in prison" with what must have been a horrifying moment, I felt the same outrage. "We had a blindfold and plastic cuffs, hands behind our backs, heads against the wall. Basically there were weapons cocking. Someone, I'm not sure who, someone said, I quote 'lads, lads I think we're going to get executed'."

(Oh, sorry, wrong graphics!)

Yet, when the 15 British servicemen and woman were returned, unharmed (and untortured), in fact, after being treated "humanely" according to their own rendition of events, I find the outrage, even my own, a little bit disingenuous. (Funny how both BBC and CNN - the two website I checked - don't mention that "humanely treated" comment although I watched and heard one of the sailors say it.)

Yes, I am happy for their safe return, but let's not be too quick to throw rocks from own glass house. In fact, as far as torture goes, this can only rate as high as a slight inconvenience.

More to the point, as mortified as I am sure these 15 Brits were, and as undeserving of this treatment that they are, I can only think about all those poor souls locked up for years in Guantanamo, Abu Gharib, CIA torture sites around the world, and all those renditioned to the bowels of Middle Eastern and Asian torture dungeons. Are they all deserving of their treatment? Did any of them ever get their day in court? Is anyone ever deserving of such treatment?

Yet, when the leader of the free world, as the US is, declares that torture is at times necessary, that is when all bets are off. Game over! As far as the rest of the world is concerned, we no longer reign over the moral high ground.

(Yes, that is why international law matters and respecting our treaty obligations is in our self-interest!)

But that is not where the tragedy of all this ends. The Iranians beat us at our own game. They have the initiative. Long after anyone cares whether or not those sailors were in Iraqi or Iranian waters, what the world will remember is that the Iranians did not really harm them, returned them safely, and still the US and Britain decried their actions while never apologizing or atoning for their own far greater misdeeds.

This PR round goes to the Iranians!

It is almost as if it would have been better if the Iranians had behaved as poorly as we have... And maybe they have, but that is not what the world sees.....

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Sunday, February 11, 2007

Transcript of Putin's Munich Thunder

But a few thoughts first: When the cold war ended, it became conventional wisdom supported by evidence on the ground that the Soviet Union had disintegrated from within due to rampant economic failure, political malfeasance, and the new realities of the growing global village. A few argued that sustained US pressure also aided in the demise. As Eastern European and Russian people began to demand the right to forge their own destinies, the wall both physical and mental came down.

Some took this as the end of history and the ushering in of a new era of international peace and stability grounded in economic and institutional connectivity, dependence, and cooperation - a community of states. After-all the Internet meant we were all one world, right?

Yet, while this new world was being contemplated, the new reality of a unipolar world emerged - the US was now in the position to call the shots.

However, how long did we think it would take for Russia, a massive country with formidable resources and history, to reconstitute itself and reclaim its seat at the table?

With the consistent pressure of an encroaching NATO, US forces in two countries south of Russia, and the looming possibility of a third US conquest, it should come as no surprise that Russia is calling time-out.

What would indeed be interesting is to hear what a Chinese version of Putin's speech would contain.

Here are a few quotes [with some annotation] from Putin's speech delivered yesterday at the 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy. The speech took only a few minutes to deliver, but its echo is likely to be heard for quite a while....

[Recognizing the explosive nature of his comments....]This conference’s structure allows me to avoid excessive politeness and the need to speak in roundabout, pleasant but empty diplomatic terms. This conference’s format will allow me to say what I really think about international security problems. And if my comments seem unduly polemical, pointed or inexact to our colleagues, then I would ask you not to get angry with me. After all, this is only a conference.

[Quoting a US president was a nice touch...] This universal, indivisible character of security is expressed as the basic principle that “security for one is security for all”. As Franklin D. Roosevelt said during the first few days that the Second World War was breaking out: “When peace has been broken anywhere, the peace of all countries everywhere is in danger.”

The unipolar world that had been proposed after the Cold War did not take place either.

However, what is a unipolar world? However one might embellish this term, at the end of the day it refers to one type of situation, namely one centre of authority, one centre of force, one centre of decision-making.

[From Russia with love...] It is world in which there is one master, one sovereign. And at the end of the day this is pernicious not only for all those within this system, but also for the sovereign itself because it destroys itself from within.

And this certainly has nothing in common with democracy. Because, as you know, democracy is the power of the majority in light of the interests and opinions of the minority.

[Ouch...] Incidentally, Russia – we – are constantly being taught about democracy. But for some reason those who teach us do not want to learn themselves.

[As for Iraq...] Unilateral and frequently illegitimate actions have not resolved any problems. Moreover, they have caused new human tragedies and created new centres of tension.

[Stay away from Iran....] Today we are witnessing an almost uncontained hyper use of force – military force – in international relations, force that is plunging the world into an abyss of permanent conflicts. As a result we do not have sufficient strength to find a comprehensive solution to any one of these conflicts. Finding a political settlement also becomes impossible.

[Who said international law is epiphenomenal?] We are seeing a greater and greater disdain for the basic principles of international law. And independent legal norms are, as a matter of fact, coming increasingly closer to one state’s legal system. One state and, of course, first and foremost the United States, has overstepped its national borders in every way. This is visible in the economic, political, cultural and educational policies it imposes on other nations. Well, who likes this? Who is happy about this?

I am convinced that we have reached that decisive moment when we must seriously think about the architecture of global security.

And we must proceed by searching for a reasonable balance between the interests of all participants in the international dialogue. Especially since the international landscape is so varied and changes so quickly – changes in light of the dynamic development in a whole number of countries and regions.

In connection with this the role of multilateral diplomacy is significantly increasing. The need for principles such as openness, transparency and predictability in politics is uncontested and the use of force should be a really exceptional measure, comparable to using the death penalty in the judicial systems of certain states.

[And let's not forget the UK, Italy and Denmark...] However, today we are witnessing the opposite tendency, namely a situation in which countries that forbid the death penalty even for murderers and other, dangerous criminals are airily participating in military operations that are difficult to consider legitimate. And as a matter of fact, these conflicts are killing people – hundreds and thousands of civilians!

[As for nuclear weapons... ] Together with the United States of America we agreed to reduce our nuclear strategic missile capabilities to up to 1700-2000 nuclear warheads by 31 December 2012. Russia intends to strictly fulfil the obligations it has taken on. We hope that our partners will also act in a transparent way and will refrain from laying aside a couple of hundred superfluous nuclear warheads for a rainy day. And if today the new American Defence Minister declares that the United States will not hide these superfluous weapons in warehouse or, as one might say, under a pillow or under the blanket, then I suggest that we all rise and greet this declaration standing. It would be a very important declaration.

Russia strictly adheres to and intends to further adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as well as the multilateral supervision regime for missile technologies. The principles incorporated in these documents are universal ones.

In connection with this I would like to recall that in the 1980s the USSR and the United States signed an agreement on destroying a whole range of small- and medium-range missiles but these documents do not have a universal character.

Today many other countries have these missiles, including the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea, India, Iran, Pakistan and Israel. Many countries are working on these systems and plan to incorporate them as part of their weapons arsenals. And only the United States and Russia bear the responsibility to not create such weapons systems.

It is obvious that in these conditions we must think about ensuring our own security.


We are unequivocally in favour of strengthening the regime of non-proliferation. The present international legal principles allow us to develop technologies to manufacture nuclear fuel for peaceful purposes. And many countries with all good reasons want to create their own nuclear energy as a basis for their energy independence. But we also understand that these technologies can be quickly transformed into nuclear weapons.

This creates serious international tensions. The situation surrounding the Iranian nuclear programme acts as a clear example. And if the international community does not find a reasonable solution for resolving this conflict of interests, the world will continue to suffer similar, destabilising crises because there are more threshold countries than simply Iran. We both know this. We are going to constantly fight against the threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

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Saturday, February 10, 2007

Putin's Munich Missive

Updated:
Today in Munich, Russia's President, Vladimir Putin, warned of the dangers of a unipolar world. His statement, tantamount to the proverbial dropping of the gauntlet, came at the 43rd Munich Conference for Security Policy. In a speech very reminiscent of the days of bipolar yore, Putin pointed at the United States as perhaps the leading cause of international insecurity today.

His argument is that the US unconstrained use of military might is placing other countries in a position of insecurity which in turn is pushing them towards seeking nuclear weapons. In other words, the US has become a catalyst for an international nuclear arms race.

Unfortunately, the Conference website does not yet have the English translation [update: it is now online] of the speech, but news reports are quoting him as saying:

According to BBC:
Mr Putin told senior security officials from around the world that nations were "witnessing an almost unconstrained hyper use of force in international relations".
"One state, the United States, has overstepped its national borders in every way," the Russian president said.
"This is very dangerous. Nobody feels secure anymore because nobody can hide behind international law," he said, speaking through a translator.
"This is nourishing an arms race with the desire of countries to get nuclear weapons."


And here is the Washington Post:
Russian President Vladimir Putin, in some of his harshest criticism of the United States since he took office seven years ago, said Saturday that Washington's unilateral, militaristic approach had made the world a more dangerous place than at any time during the Cold War.

"The United States has overstepped its national borders in every way," he said in an address at an annual international security conference here. "Nobody feels secure anymore, because nobody can take safety behind the stone wall of international law."

The Russian president defended his country's arms sales to Iran as a way of reaching out to that Middle Eastern power, which is under pressure from the United States and Europe to curtail its nuclear program. Russia has supplied some air defense weapons to Iran because, he said, "we don't want Iran to feel cornered."

And the New York Times:
President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia accused the United States on Saturday of provoking a new nuclear arms race by developing ballistic missile defenses, undermining international institutions and making the Middle East more unstable through its clumsy handling of the Iraq war.

In an address to an international security conference, Mr. Putin dropped all diplomatic gloss to recite a long list of complaints about American domination of global affairs, including many of the themes that have strained relations between the Kremlin and the United States during his seven-year administration.

Among them were the expansion of NATO into the Baltics and the perception in Russia that the West has supported groups that have toppled other governments in Moscow’s former sphere of influence.

Rubble from the Berlin Wall was “hauled away as souvenirs” to countries that praise openness and personal freedom, he said, but “now there are attempts to impose new dividing lines and rules, maybe virtual, but still dividing our mutual continent.”

The world, he said, is now unipolar: “One single center of power. One single center of force. One single center of decision making. This is the world of one master, one sovereign.”

Yet, before the pundits rush to shoot the messenger, perhaps his words are worthy of some serious thought. Does the perception of threat contained in such words as "axis of evil" cause those targeted states to suddenly feel threatened?

More to the point, did Bush's use of those words suggest to North Korea and Iran that they better get nuclear weapons before the US invades push them to pursue their nuclear programs quicker? Did the US invasion and occupation of Iraq only strengthen their threat perception? Are other states watching and taking note? On the other hand, was the US only alerting the world to what was already underfoot in these countries?

Now that these states are pursuing their self-interest, are neighboring states feeling the pressure to protect themselves as well? In short, has the US triggered a chain reaction? Already, other countries in the Middle East are embarking on "civilian" nuclear programs, with, it should be added, US blessings.

What about international law? Has the US disregard for international law and norms paved the way for other states to do the same? Or, as Putin may have been suggesting, has the US military actions and bellicose discourse suggested to states that international law is no longer (if it ever was) a restraint against hyper power incursion and threat? If states no longer view international law and norms as protecting state sovereignty against military threat, then has the US short term action resulted in a medium term affirmation of the realist world of self-help?

In short, this is a debate worthy of having.

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Monday, January 29, 2007

Spotlight on Israel's War Crimes - Cluster Bombs

Updated: See end of post
Last summer, Israel unleashed a massive assault aimed, supposedly, against Hizbollah fighters. It was Lebanon's innocent civilians who paid the price... and it was a huge one. More Lebanese children died in the offensive than adult fighters; it is a despicable reality that everyone should feel the shame of. It will take billions of dollars and years for Lebanon to repair the physical damage (with the emotional damage likely to fuel a new generation of animosity). In fact, Lebanon lost all the economic and social progress it so painstakingly forged over the past dozen years; an outcome perhaps not lost on the Israeli cabinet.

While the rest of the world seems to have moved on after a momentary whimper of indignation, the US government looked into some of the practices of the Israeli army. Specifically, the US probed into the use by Israel of cluster bombs against civilians, behavior which is illegal under international law. It is estimated that Israel dropped over 4 million cluster bombs on Lebanon. Israel itself admits to 1 million. It is difficult to see how this can be justified against a few hundred Hizbollah fighters. It is even more difficult to find credible the Israeli claim that they were justified in dropping them on civilian neighborhoods.

Well, the verdict has come in and it seems that Israel will be declared guilty; small vindication to the hundreds who died in a brutal way.

Yet, the horror is not over for the Lebanese. Tens of thousands of intact bomblets still litter neighborhoods, farms and groves. As though this were not bad enough, upon exiting last summer, Israel also laid landmines across south Lebanon, according to the United Nations.

Now that it has been determined that Israel used these weapons illegally, will the world demand that it provide the resources to have these bombs removed so that they do not explode killing and maiming hundreds more?

Update: It seems that being associated with Israeli war crimes is not enough to stop the US military-industrial complex grind. IHT reports that Israel signed a $100 million deal with Boeing in Chicago to buy more bombs to "replenish" its stock depleted by the Lebanon onslaught. Go figure....

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Tuesday, August 08, 2006

Israel and the Principle of Proportionality

Today I was faced with a situation where I was expected to express my views on the legality of Israel's actions in Lebanon in terms of the international legal concept of proportionality. I was in an academic setting being questioned by a scholar with a clear pro-Israel stance. She challenged me to express a legal argument "free from personal bias." Despite the fact that her stance was anything but impersonally guided, I took her advice to heart and found great ease in expressing the illegality of Israel's atrocities in Lebanon from a "purely" academic perspective. I shall leave aside, for the moment, the preposterous belief that any legal view may be detached from a political bias, with the Supreme Court being a case in point.

On the question of what proportionality (in bello) in terms of international law means, there has been much confusion in the media and amongst the talking heads especially with respect to Israel's latest actions in both Gaza and Lebanon. Proportionality in international law does not refer to a situation where one side is constrained by the amount of force its enemy may or may not possess. In other words, because Hezbollah is limited in its weaponry does not mean that Israel must use the same level of force.

Proportionality in the conduct of war means that a state may unilaterally defend itself and/or undertake a reprisal provided the response is proportional to the injury sustained. The injury sustained, according to Israel, is the kidnapping of two of its soldiers. It was only after the commencement of its offensive against Lebanon that Israel expanded this injury to include ending the ability of Hezbollah to launch any further attacks against Israel. Whatever Israel is doing in Lebanon is supposedly in response to that wrong. Thus, proportionality must be evaluated in terms of that expressed wrong.

Fortunately, there is no positive law detailing numbers or ratios of acceptable "collateral damage". However, reasonable people can agree or disagree on what is considered "acceptable" and this level of acceptability is likely to be conditioned by what side of the conflict one sits, in addition to one's value of human life. For me, and for many others, that level has been exceeded in Lebanon. Thus, there are some who would argue that even one innocent civilian death is too many, while others at the other extreme, may draw the line at nuking a village or city if it means weeding out a "terrorist". The important issue here is that the principle does exist and what is in debate is where to draw the line.

However, the laws of war, as enumerated in numerous international conventions such as the Hague Conventions of 1907 and the Geneva Conventions of 1949, underline the fact that there are 2 overriding principles which should guide hostilities, namely, proportionality AND discrimination. This latter principle is defined by immunity of non-combatants from being targeted during times of war. This exclusion extends to civilian infrastructure and property.

Thus, when Israel bombs and kills over 1,200 civilians, decimates homes and destroys basic infrastructure needed by the civilian population to survive, in order, according to its own declarations, to root out 50 Hezbollah combatants, Israel may be held to account for contravening the laws of war - both proportionality and discrimination. The applicable terms are war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity.

The issue of proportionality and Israel's action in both Gaza and Lebanon were recently addressed by the Council on Foreign Relations and I quote:

"What is the doctrine of proportionality? The doctrine originated with the 1907 Hague Conventions, which govern the laws of war, and was later codified in Article 49 of the International Law Commission's 1980 Draft Articles on State Responsibility (PDF). The doctrine is also referred to indirectly in the 1977 Additional Protocols of the Geneva Conventions. Regardless of whether states are party to the treaties above, experts say the principle is part of what is known as customary international law. According to the doctrine, a state is legally allowed to unilaterally defend itself and right a wrong provided the response is proportional to the injury suffered. The response must also be immediate and necessary, refrain from targeting civilians, and require only enough force to reinstate the status quo ante. That said, experts say the proportionality principle is open to interpretation and depends on the context. "It's always a subjective test," says Michael Newton, associate clinical professor of law at Vanderbilt University Law School. "But if someone punches you in the nose, you don't burn their house down."

The Council article goes on to say: "How does the doctrine apply to the current context in Israel? Many legal experts say Israel's response to the recent abductions has not upheld the principle of proportionality and violates international humanitarian law."

Human Rights Watch website contains a discussion of the Israeli action in Lebanon from the perspective of International Humanitarian Law. One interesting issue discussed relates to the so-called humanitarian Israeli practice of dropping leaflets on trapped civilians exhorting them to leave the vicinity (yet not allowing them the means to comply). Quote:

"Do the warnings given to Lebanese civilians in advance of IDF attacks comply with international humanitarian law? The IDF, through leaflets dropped by aircraft, radio broadcasts and recorded messages to telephones, has repeatedly called on civilians in southern Lebanon to evacuate their areas. International humanitarian law requires that warring parties give “effective advance warning” of attacks that may affect the civilian population, so long as circumstances permit. What constitutes an “effective” warning will depend on the circumstances. Such an assessment would take into account the timing of the warning and the ability of the civilians to leave the area. In some cases the IDF are reported to have dropped leaflets giving residents only two hours warning before a threatened attack. Bomb damage to roads and bridges, as well as air attacks on civilian vehicles, would also affect the ability of civilians to flee an expected attack. Civilians who do not evacuate following warnings are still fully protected by international law. Otherwise, warring parties could use warnings to cause forced displacement, threatening civilians with deliberate harm if they did not heed them. So, even after warnings have been given, attacking forces must still take all feasible precautions to avoid loss of civilian life and property. This includes canceling an attack when it becomes apparent that the target is civilian or that the civilian loss would be disproportionate to the expected military gain."

Today Israel demanded from the civilians of Tyre to evacuate the vicinity yet, in the same leaflet, warned against any attempt to leave in vehicles as all moving vehicles would be targeted for bombing. Does Israel assume that the elderly, young, sick and even the healthy are supposed to make a run for it by foot under the rain of Israeli bombardment across rivers, hills, mountains, and otherwise difficult terrain? In the absence of any other logic, this is beginning to look like an extermination campaign.... and that is a conclusion filled with personal bias not due to any political view but rather as a human being!

The terrorizing and killing of innocent civilians is defined as terrorism, perpetrated by terrorists. Israel has placed this label on Hezbollah. However, righting the wrong that Israel claims does not come about by descending to the same level and sinking even further into moral deficit and legal delict. Shame!

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Monday, June 12, 2006

Iraq War Implications for United Nations, Law and Just War

As I have written before, the US Iraq war project rested on a three-leg stool, namely that the 2003 invasion was a valid and necessary response to over 12 years of Iraqi intransigence, was necessary to prevent Iraq from threatening the world with its assumed weapons of mass destruction and its possible alliance with Al-Qaeda, and was necessary to bring to an end the suffering of the Iraqi people and usher in the dawn of democracy in Iraq and eventually the Middle East region. My earlier posts have attempted to illustrate how justifications of the war in Iraq were constructed to appear legitimate, while an analysis of its claimed legitimacy suggests otherwise. With any pressure, brought on by even a cursory examination, this war stool falls flat. However, if these types of war justifications emerge as acceptable practice, there may be severely altering implications for both international law and perceptions of just war.

The US-led invasion of Iraq threatens severe consequences to customary international law, and the veracity of the UN Charter regime. The greatest threat lies in the international community not acting to refute the legitimacy of the political strategy expressed in both the 2002, and, as reformulated, in the 2006 United States National Security Strategy. The US-led 2003 invasion of Iraq has shaken the foundation of the international legal order, and unless international actors, states and organizations, address this backward-looking moral trajectory, there is a threat of the slippery-slope of reverting to unconstrained aggression by and between states, with the added dimension posed by the activities of illegitimate non-state actors. As noted by Lori Fisler Damrosch and Bernard Oxman in an introductory article in the 2003 issue of the American Journal of International Law focused on the legality and impact of the Iraq war, “(t)he military action against Iraq in spring 2003 is one of the few events of the UN Charter period holding the potential for fundamental transformation, or possibly even destruction, of the system of law governing the use of force that had evolved during the twentieth century…. The implications of the war for the future of the international system may depend in some measure on whether the issue of its legality is limited to interpretation of Security Council resolutions applicable only to Iraq, or broadened to embrace the very meaning, utility, and vitality of the Charter’s basic provisions on the use of force and self-defense.”[1]

Just war doctrine has evolved through the centuries with the objective of defining a common understanding of how the horrors of war may be limited when war becomes the only possible means of human interaction; its objective is to avert conflict whenever possible and end conflict sooner rather than later if it must occur. Recognizing that peace is not the mere absence of war, the international community has seen to expand the just causes of war to include humanitarian intervention to avert human catastrophe and end further human suffering. Regime change, while perhaps a valid political objective is not an underlying tenant of humanitarian intervention as widely accepted by the states of the world. Recognizing that an argument for humanitarian intervention would not stand in the Iraq context, the US has attempted to frame democracy as a basic human right deserving of military intervention in order to bring about. If such an argument is accepted, the definition of humanitarian intervention would be expanded to incorporate engendering democratization through the barrel of a gun, or “at the tip of a spear”.[2] The potential consequence of this may be to allow states to justify military intervention into neighboring states to instill political systems acceptable to the intervening state. On the other hand, a failure to intervene in a country suffering under a non-democratic system, would engender feelings of double standards and thus adding fuel to already volatile senses of injustice around the world.

Essentially the debate around the US notion of preventive war is not only one that threatens to revert the world to a pre-Westphalian era, but also implies the acceptance as a moral given the right of a state that perceives a potential threat, rather than faces an actual imminent intent to harm, to take anticipatory military action. Such rationale harkens back to historic times of past millennia where the mighty to preserve their predominance would crush potential adversaries wherever they may be perceived. Such is the rationale which accepted that the mighty may do as they will and the weak as they must. Such is the rationale which based on potential threat scenarios justified a war resulting in death and destruction, with the unjustified loss of both blood and treasure. The moral trajectory set in motion by such thinking is imbued with notions of superior righteousness and conceptions of the future rather than an acceptance of the world’s diversity and a grip on reality. The world after the great wars of the last century chose to break such cycles which it identified as being immoral, but also self-harming. With respect to just war, the US-led invasion of Iraq serves to underscore and strengthen just war principles if only because it stands as such a stark illustration of injustice, but also because it proves that the morality and self-interest that underscores just war principles is validated.

[1] Damrosch, Lori Fisler and Bernard H. Oxman. “Editor’s Introduction” in The American Journal of International Law, (Vol. 97, No. 3, Jul., 2003, pp. 553-557 at 553-554). Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-9300%28200307%2997%3A3%3C553%3AEI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-I
[2] Franklin Eric Wester, “Preemption and Just War: Considering the Case of Iraq”, in Parameters, (U.S. Army War College, December, 22, 2004, Vol. 34, Issue 4, pg. 36), found at http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/parameters/04winter/wester.pdf

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Thursday, June 01, 2006

The Iraq War Project, International Law and Just War

© 2006 justdahlia.blogspot.com

Hypocrisy is rife in wartime discourse, because it is especially important at such a time to appear to be in the right…. The hypocrite presumes on the moral understanding of the rest of us…. If we had all become realists like the Athenian generals or like Hobbists in a state of war, there would be an end alike to both morality and hypocrisy. We would simply tell one another, brutally and directly, what we want to do or have done. But the truth is that one of the things we most want, even in war, is to act or seem to act morally.
Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars [1]

The 2003 invasion of Iraq is not only in contradiction to norms of customary international law as well as positive international law, but also should be considered a war of unjust cause, and, in turn, is being prosecuted unjustly. From Aquinas to the Scholastics to Grotius and Kant, just war doctrine, and natural law’s concept of jus gentium, has emerged as a constitutive element of both customary and positive international law[2]. Accordingly, any assessment of the construction of the Bush Iraq war stool requires an understanding of the constitutive elements as they relate to international law, and, more broadly, to just war doctrine.

As a preliminary note to limit any revisionist pitfalls, there has been no attempt to discuss the veracity of the claims put forth by the Bush administration or any other member of the ‘coalition of the willing’ to justify going to war, nor of the veracity of claims made about events likely to occur after going to war, merely that such claims were made as justification for war suffices for analysis, irrespective of their validity. It is the intellectual construction of these justifications, not their validity, which is being assessed. This distinction is important because even if the argument for war was deemed to rest on both valid legal and moral grounds yet the factual claims underlying the arguments turned out to be unfounded due to faulty intelligence or intentions, or both, the debate would then revolve around a revisionist assessment of who knew what, when and how, and what was done with the information, rather than an assessment of the validity of the war project itself. The fact that all such claims have proven faulty, at best, post-facto only underscores the value of adhering to accepted legal and moral standards as preconditions to engaging in a war project. The focus here is on whether such standards were met and the potential implications of such practice being accepted as a new legal and moral benchmark.

Jus Ad Bellum
Just war doctrine has developed over the past two thousand years (or longer if a non-Euro/Christian centric view is taken) as the guiding normative framework for affairs of war and peace between peoples and states.[3] As the doctrine has evolved, distinction is made between two components of just war, namely, the justice of going to war, jus ad bellum, and justice during war, jus in bello.[4] With respect to jus ad bellum, the focus of the analysis here, the overwhelming majority of recent just war ethicists agree that there are six components that require satisfaction for a war to be deemed as justly waged,[5] namely, proper authority, just cause/intent, public declaration, proportionality, last resort and probability of success.[6] The analysis will involve an assessment of how satisfactorily elements of these components applied in the context of the war in Iraq, which, when relevant, will involve a normative application of international law.

Proper Authority – No United Nations Sanction
An essential prerequisite of jus ad bellum rests in the legitimacy of the party waging war on another party; this principle is captured in the concept of ‘proper authority’. On the level of municipal actions, proper authority is derived from the governing laws of the state. In the arena of international relations, states, in joining the United Nations, recognize such authority to be with the Security Council. Increasingly, an emerging norm of authority is being recognized at a regional level, as well, such as in the case of the actions of ECOWAS in west Africa and NATO in the Balkans, especially when such regional groupings are recognized by the UN and are granted observer status. While such regional action was not sanctioned by the United Nations prior to the military action, in neither case was the action decried. In the case of NATO, a draft resolution to condemn the intervention in Kosovo was resoundingly defeated in the Security Council by a vote of 12 to 3[7], and in the case of ECOWAS, actions in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Cote D’Ivoire did not even engender Security Council debate, while later SCR commended ECOWAS peacekeeping efforts post-facto.[8] The ad-hoc action of a coalition of states, acting under no particular organization, either the UN or a recognized regional pact, such as in the case of the action in Iraq by the ‘coalition of the willing’, can be seen to lie at a lower level of authority. At the lowest level of authority lies unilateral action of a state. Such a delineation of levels of authority suggests a continuum from an extreme of ‘proper authority’ under the consensus explicit in a Security Council resolution to the lowest level of a lack of authority explicit in unilateral military action taken by a state with no sanction either from an international body or even a coalition state. Such a conceptualization is depicted in Figure 2[9]. The analysis is based on the four levels of authority discussed plotted against the level of international consensus implied by that level of authority. The consensus parameter only serves to depict the relationship of state approval/acceptance implied by levels of authority and as such is a latent descriptor and not an explanatory variable. Within this framework is plotted various military actions post-1945 with the start of the UN Charter Regime.

Figure 2: Proper Authority Continuum - missing (to be uploaded later)
* Note: In the case of NATO in Kosovo and ECOWAS in Liberia, the number of consenting states is imputed from the number of member states of the organization itself, in addition to the remaining number of UN member states less dissenting states in GA and SC debates. See Gray footnote 46 and Simon Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace?, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).

The above analysis illustrates the significance of proper authority in just war. To the extent that war can be just, the justice must be perceived by the states that are called upon to accept this justice. To the extent that international law is predicated on an expression of the consent of the community of states, proper authority can only rest with the organizations that represent such consent. In view of this, did the US-led action in Iraq in 2003 fulfill the jus ad bellum criterion of ‘proper authority’, or does it belong in such a low rating on the ‘proper authority’ continuum as depicted in Figure 2? Such an answer can be sought from an analysis of the events within the Security Council leading up to the March 2003 invasion.

Determining proper authority in the case of the war on Iraq depends on the argument being put forward to justify the invasion. As noted, the war in Iraq has been argued both as a case of preventive war, implying unilateral action, as well as a case of a final battle in the war begun in 1990 with Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and Iraq’s subsequent refusal to fulfill its ceasefire obligations, thus invoking United Nations authority. In the case of humanitarian intervention, the third justification, proper authority would also rest with the United Nations, or, based on emerging practice, on a regional organization, such as the Arab League, or possibly, NATO. In the case of Iraq, the US did seek NATO support but was rejected, and the Arab League condemned any action against Iraq. At this point, the US and the UK directed their appeal for consent to the United Nations Security Council. When this was rejected, the US with an ad-hoc coalition invoked the right to self-defense under its newly crafted doctrine of preventive war. It should be noted, however, that the UK and most other members of the ‘coalition of the willing’ did not rely on the US preventive war argument, and, instead, relied on interpretations of SCR. What then was the Security Council debate under question?

Between August 1990 and May 2003[10], the United Nations Security Council issued fifty-seven resolutions (SCR) concerning Iraq. In 1990, the SC unanimously passed resolution 660 condemning the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. A few weeks later, it issued resolution 678 again calling upon Iraq to comply with relevant resolutions and authorizing member states to use all means necessary to force Iraq to comply. Thus, for the first time in its history, the United Nations had invoked Chapter VII military action against a UN member state. In March 1991, the SC passed SCR 686 which declared an end to hostilities against Iraq. SCR 687 then called upon Iraq to unconditionally accept weapons inspections and set up the UN-managed inspection regime of Iraq’s military capabilities including WMD program. During the rest of the 1990’s and up until SCR 1441 of November 2002, the UN had cited Iraq for numerous infractions of its inspection obligations. SCR 1441 warned of serious consequences, but stopped short of using the same language of SCR 678 authorizing the use of force. It should also be noted that all military actions undertaken by the US and the UK in monitoring and enforcing the ‘no-fly zones’ in the north and south of Iraq during the 1990’s were undertaken without SC authorization. From this scenario, emerged the debate for and against military action against Iraq based on two opposing readings and interpretations of the relevant SCRs.

Those in favor of military action argued that the situation in Iraq represented ongoing action against Iraq as a result of its invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Accordingly, as Iraq was in material breach of its cease-fire obligations, SCR 1441 automatically invoked the authorization to use force under SCR 678. Those opposing such an interpretation argue that there was no automacity implied in SCR 1441, and, in fact, during debates it was made clear by most members of the Security Council that SCR 1441 should not be interpreted as automatically invoking SCR 678. It is due to the strength of this position that the UK called upon the US to request a second explicit resolution from the SC authorizing the use of force. When France declared that it would veto any such resolution, the US and the UK offered none. Instead, the US and the UK reverted to their earlier position, asserting that SCR 1441 offered all the sanction they needed. The majority of the member state of the UN disagreed with this position. In fact, the UN Secretary General took the unusual step of declaring the war in Iraq to be illegal.[11]

As noted by Vaughan Lowe, by far the greatest argument against the action in Iraq as having been undertaken with proper authority is the sheer weakness of the argument which pales in the face of the enormity of what is being justified, namely war resulting in massive death and destruction. “It is said that Resolution 1441 would in terms have provided that a further decision of the Security Council to sanction force was required, if that had been intended. That raises a more basic point. It is simply unacceptable that a step as serious and important as a massive military attack upon a State should be launched on the basis of a legal argument dependent upon dubious inferences drawn from the silences in resolution 1441 and the muffled echoes of earlier resolutions, unsupported by any contemporary authorization to use force. No domestic court in the United States or the United Kingdom would tolerate governmental action based upon such flimsy arguments.”[12]

Just Cause/Intent – Regime Change and Humanitarian Intervention
Having a meritorious cause is a basic tenet of jus ad bellum and just war doctrine. Just cause from Aquinas to Vitoria and Suarez is seen to exist in one of two postures, defensive and offensive, where the former is intended toward defending against an impeding injustice and the later intended towards rectifying an injustice having occurred. The modern equivalent of this dichotomy is self-defense and justifiable intervention such as in the case of an outright aggression. In either case, the objective is to restore the status quo ante bellum. Recent departures from this later requirement arises in the case of humanitarian intervention as an emerging norm of justifiable intervention, which by definition, may not result in a restoration of the pre-war condition since that was the condition which precipitated the intervention to begin with. In such an instance, the criteria becomes whether or not the intervention was to avert or stem an overwhelming human catastrophe, and where the intended beneficiary of the intervention should be the people of the state being intervened in. Retribution is not an element of just cause.

In the case of the 2003 Iraq war project, if one takes the position that the 2003 invasion was a continuation of the 1991 Gulf War as a final battle in one war effort, then jus ad bellum requirements of just intent become moot. However, this first requires an acceptable and cogent argument that it is indeed a continuation of the 1991 war effort and it assumes that such an argument was made by the US and its allies. In the first instance, as noted in the earlier discussion concerning proper authority, the US and the UK failed to convince the majority of states that military action was indeed an automatic outcome of Iraq’s 1990 aggression against Kuwait. However, in the second instance, while the European members of the ‘coalition of the willing’ based much of their arguments on such interpretations of the Security Council resolutions, the US focused on the doctrine of preventive war as expressed in its 2002 National Security Strategy.

The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction— and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively. …. the United States cannot remain idle while dangers gather.
United States National Security Strategy, 2002

Preventive war, to be understood as distinct from preemptive war, is not a recognized principle of either international law or just war doctrine. For further clarity, preemptive war arises when, in self-defense, a state acts with military force to avert a clear, present and imminent danger.[13] Such a right of self-defense was upheld in the Caroline case in 1837.[14] On the other hand, “[p]reventive war has no legal or ethical sanction, because the threat is neither clear nor present.”[15] The Bush Administration’s preventive war doctrine, as prosecuted in the invasion of Iraq it led in 2003, it is here argued, may be an expression of a political and hegemonic prerogative, however, it is not a legal one, nor is it just. As noted by Arthur Schlesinger, advisor to President Kennedy, “[O]ne of the astonishing events of recent months is the presentation of preventive war as a legitimate and moral instrument of U.S. foreign policy.”[16]

As a result of the events of September 1, the United Nations issued SCR 1368 and 1373 which raised acts of terrorism to the level of threats of national security legitimizing self-defense action under Article 51 of the UN Charter. It is on this basis that the US led its invasion of Afghanistan; it is this argument that the US predominantly relied on to justify war with Iraq. While in the case of Afghanistan, the US was defending itself against Al Qaeda and their state-protectors, the Taliban, in the case of war on Iraq, the argument rested on a conflation of the same ‘war on terrorism’ and the fear of Iraqi (nonexistent) weapons of mass destruction falling into the hands of Al Qaeda. The US rationale for preventive war with Iraq fails the test of legality for the following reasons:

1 - The basis for a state’s right to claim both self-defense and collective self-defense emerges from the UN Charter, Security Council resolutions and case law including the Caroline and Nicaragua[17] cases. This right was extended to include terrorism both by UN SC Resolutions 1368 and 1373 as well as the UN sanctioned strike against Afghanistan. While there is indication that both customary international law and the United Nations recognize the right of a state to defend itself in the face of state-sponsored terrorism, the requirements of necessity and proportionality still apply, neither of which exists in the case of Iraq, which had never attacked, threatened to attack or supported terrorists against the US or any of its allies. If there is no necessity, there can be no case for proportionality and thus no case for collective self-defense. Furthermore, while the US and Israel have argued that terrorists can be hit no matter where they reside, international law has not yet recognized such indiscriminate pursuit within a third-party state especially if no support to the terrorists can be attributable to this third party state.

2 - As a result of the 1991 Gulf War, the UN instituted a regimen of economic sanctions and weapons inspection against Iraq in line with UN Charter Chapter VII and specifically Article 41 and 48. Those in charge of these programs declared to the UN that there were signs that such sanctions and inspections were working[18]. At the UN, France spoke to the general belief among UN member states and against the US/UK claims and declared that the inspections should be allowed to continue. The US-led ad-hoc coalition decided to disregard international opinion and the jurisdiction of both the UN and the IAEA, specifically Article 48 which stipulates that the Security Council is to decide which member states are to take action, thus putting itself outside the internationally recognized realm of legal remedy.

3 - However, even despite this and assuming that Iraq did possess weapons of mass destruction, international law does not sanction a war against another state for merely possessing such weapons. Even Bush’s own doctrine of pre-emptive strike assumes that there is at least the threat of a potential attack. The UN Charter under Article 42 requires the UN to declare when and if there exists a potential threat to the peace, let alone an actual breach of the peace. Furthermore, first-resort remedies should be in favor of peaceful means in the absence of imminent threat. There was no imminent threat, there was no expressed threat, there was no clandestine threat, and there was no real or legal basis for a determination of a threat to peace and security of the US or any of its allies. Thus, the US defense of its war against Iraq is both illegal as a basis and factually erroneous in substance, as was declared before the US-led military action against Iraq.

The third reason given by the US for invasion of Iraq is that it was to free the Iraqi people of a brutal dictator and thus bring about regime change and democracy. ‘Regime change’ is not a justification recognized under international law, nor is it a principle that can satisfy the jus ad bellum requirement of just intent that the status quo ante bellum be restored. In fact, it can be argued that it is in direct contradiction to both customary and UN-recognized law of the sovereignty of nations as reaffirmed in the UN General Assembly Resolution (2625 of 1970) on Principles of Friendly Relations Among States[19]. Regime change which results from legitimate action taken against a state may be an acceptable consequence, but it cannot be a rationale in itself for the action.[20]

Furthermore, a political objective of ‘regime change’ should not be confused with a humanitarian objective of ‘regime change’. The former entails a change to achieve an outcome desired by the belligerent for the benefit of the belligerent; the latter assumes an action whose prime objective is to benefit the oppressed people suffering under the would-be vanquished tyrant. One is self-serving; the second serves others. As noted by Dominic McGoldrick, “the legal debate on the Iraqi crisis was not conducted by states in terms of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. That doctrine had been invoked by the UK for its military intervention in Kosovo in 1999. For the US ‘regime change’ in Iraq was an explicit war objective… A number of states made statements in the SC debates to the effect that action aimed at regime change was contrary to international law. It is interesting to note that the humanitarian intervention argument has become more prevalent in the debates on the Iraq War as clear evidence weapons of mass destruction has not been found. Such retroactive justifications should be treated with much caution.”[21]

As it turned out, Iraq had no weapons of mass destruction as had been concluded before the invasion and reported by both the head of the UN weapon’s inspection effort, Hans Blix[22] and by Mohamed Elbaradei, the head of the IAEA. Furthermore, both the intelligence communities of the US and the UK had concluded before the initial invasion that Iraq had no links with Al Qaeda, let alone to the events of 9/11[23]. While not accepting the reality of such conclusions, the US then began to place greater efforts in emphasizing that its war was aimed at serving the Iraqi people to save them from its brutal dictator and usher in a new era with a government of and for the Iraqi people based on democratic values and freedoms. However, as noted above and argued by Christine Gray[24], among others, retroactive arguments of humanitarian intervention, render them questionable, at best.

Humanitarian intervention, nevertheless, is emerging as a valid element of customary international law with a potential impact on traditional notions of state sovereignty. A point made by the recent United Nations backed The Responsibility To Protect project and report[25], is that state sovereignty must be viewed as a conditional right of states contingent upon their ability to protect the human rights of its citizenry. Accordingly, it becomes the obligation of ‘freedom-loving’ states to stand up for those citizens whose rights are being abrogated by tyrants or rogue elements because their states have failed to protect them. However, to rise to the level of a situation requiring an intervention, the scale of the offense must be so grave that the intervention is necessary to avert or stem a human catastrophe. While there is every indication that Saddam Hussein committed crimes against humanity, such offenses occurred years earlier (and in many cases with the full knowledge, at least, of ‘freedom-loving’ states of the world), no such human catastrophe was being perpetrated or threatened at the time preceding the invasion which may have been used as a legitimate cause for intervention. In fact, the only indication of Iraqi human suffering was occurring during most of the decade following the first war on Iraq in 1990 as a result of the economic sanctions imposed by the United Nations and unilaterally militarily enforced by the United States and the United Kingdom. Thus, an argument for humanitarian intervention in the case of Iraq in 2003 amounts to nothing less than delayed retribution for past acts with no cause for immediate action.

Public Declaration – Explicit Intent Fully Declared
Jus ad bellum conditions require the invading/protagonist state to announce its intentions so as to offer opportunity to the antagonist to the conflict (the supposed errant causing delict) to take necessary and required action to avert the war. In the case of the 2003 Iraq war project, the US and the UK made their intentions ultimately clear during the weeks and months leading to the initiation of hostilities. To avoid a war, on March 17, 2003 the US imposed a 48-hour ultimatum[26] to Saddam Hussein and his two sons to vacate Iraq. The first military strikes were on March 19, 2003.

Proportionality – Expecting the Gain to Outweigh the Pain
Jus ad bellum’s fourth element of just war concerns the expectations of the war effort in that the expected good from the overall destruction caused by the use of force is expected to outweigh the harm caused, or, in other words, comparative justice results when a lesser evil emerges from an action such that the suffering in bello and post bello is proportionally less than the suffering ad bellum. Thus, the objective of proportionality is to avoid war if its cost in terms of “blood and treasure” outweighs the cost of nonintervention. Implied in this conundrum is an assessment of the actual gains from the Iraq war in light of the losses. However, that would involve a post bello assessment whereas the operative element of the equation is the expectations ad bellum. In other words and according to the argument used, there was the assumption that, if the war was just, by not going to war, the impact on Iraq and the world would be far worse. Accordingly, a proportionate response would necessitate action to achieve a better outcome for all the parties concerned. Without engaging in post bello assessments, was such an assumption reasonable at the time? In other words, did the US have reasonable cause on March 18, 2003 to believe that the world was worse off than it would be on March 20, 2003? As noted, the majority of the world disagreed with the US assessment. The fact that the rest of the world turned out to be right, is not the indicting fact here. What is indicting is that had the US allowed for proper application of the proportionality criterion, the greater evil may have been avoided.

Last resort – Defining Imminence
In the absence of imminent threat, is war ever a last resort? In other words, if there is no time-sensitive reason for going to war today rather than tomorrow, is there not always something other than war that can be resorted to first? Aside from the logical and philosophical rhetorics of such a question, last resort is an operational element of jus ad bellum. As noted by the weapons inspectors from Hans Blix to Mohamed El Baradei, the inspections were working, yet more time was needed to accomplish the mission.[27] Since Iraq, as noted earlier, had not threatened the US or any other member of the ‘coalition of the willing’ (or any other state, for that matter), nor was there any evidence of a clandestine threat, imminence was not a credible argument in the rush to war. As ably argued by Michael Walzer, Saddam Hussein was a threat, but not an imminent one, and, thus he supported options short of resorting to war. He argued before the war started, “[t]he right way to oppose the war is to argue that the present system of containment and control is working and can be made to work better. This means we should acknowledge the awfulness of the Iraqi regime and the dangers it poses and then aim to deal with those dangers through coercive measures short of war.”[28]

Probability of Success – Depends on Definition of Success
The final component of jus ad bellum aims to avoid pointless efforts to either wage war or defend against it. In other words, just cause if not backed by adequate might cannot result in justice and only yields yet more carnage. Assumed in such a calculation is the definition of success. If success is measured in terms of military objectives of vanquishing an enemy, then the assessment becomes a material calculation of might. However, if success entails rectifying an injustice such as in the case of a humanitarian intervention involving regime change and encompassing an occupation, then calculation of success extends beyond military might.

Clearly in the case of the US-led Iraq war project, immediate military success was a high probability. However, the US declared objectives, and thus its assessment of success, extended beyond mere decapitation of the Iraqi regime and decimation of its armed forces. Success, as defined by the US, entailed regime change, disarming, democratization and social, institutional and economic reconstruction. Calculating a probability, by definition, entails a reasonable assessment of all required inputs and a reasonable anticipation of all possible outcomes. Without resorting to revisionism, did the US prior to invading Iraq have a plan that would result in a high probability of success in terms of its war objectives? Did the US and its allies request adequate monetary resources for the post-bellum reconstruction? Did the US put forth adequate plans to win the “heart and minds” of the Iraqi people so as to ensure an avoidance of civil strife and the possibility of democratization? Did the US and its allies engage regional states, with the most to gain from a stable Iraq, let alone the states of the world, to ensure their participation in rebuilding post-war Iraq? If the answers to these questions is no, as the majority of the states in the United Nations saw it at the time, then the US and its allies failed to define their war objectives in such a way as to claim a high probability of success. As noted earlier, in the case of the 1991 Gulf War, the parameters of success were clear and achievable. In the case of the 2003 Iraq war project, success was as elusive as the war objectives were questionable.

Jus In Bello
This paper’s focus is on the road to the war with Iraq, however, in so focusing and by way of a causal link, it also addresses the justice of the actual war prosecution. As noted, a just war rests on two elements: the justice of going to war (jus ad bellum), as well as the justice in war (jus in bello). The elements of jus in bello are discrimination and proportionality where discrimination relates to the minimization of harm to non-combatants, as well as civilian property and infrastructure. Proportionality in the case of jus in bello relates to the overall destruction resulting from the use of force such that, on balance, it is outweighed by the objective achieved, whether this is the military imperative or the civilian benefit.

The distinction between the two elements of jus in bello emerged as a means of distinguishing the judgments that were involved in prosecuting a war as opposed to deciding to go to war.[29] As such, jus in bello criterion are essential guidelines for soldiers and their leaders in their everyday strategic and tactical decisions and actions in war. However, it becomes highly morally questionable, if not intellectually dishonest, when a causal break is assumed to exist between the two as though to argue that it is possible for an unjust war to be fought justly. Such a criterion may be useful, and even necessary, for the soldier to keep in his mind’s eye as he aims his weapon, however, it can not become a legal or moral excuse for the politician to assuage his responsibility for causing that soldier to be pointing the weapon in the first place, especially if based on unjust reasons. The causal link of responsibility between jus ad bellum and jus in bello may exist for the soldier in that he can choose to fight justly or unjustly, but the link can never be broken for the ruler who places the soldier in that position to begin with.

Jus in bello is based on the precepts of discrimination and proportionality, and the resulting tension between the two. Proportionality assumes, on balance, a positive outcome of the military imperative weighed against the costs, in terms of life and treasure. If the military imperative, or the cause of war, is seen to be unjust, there can be no net positive proportionality; a negative plus a negative only sinks us further into moral deficit. An unjust war cannot be fought justly for the simple reason that any death or destruction founded on unjust purpose would be, by definition, purposeless, or worse, of ill-purpose, and, thus, unjust. Accordingly, unless a war based on an unjust cause is prosecuted with 100% discrimination, it cannot be fought justly. Any indiscriminate death or destruction would be unacceptable, and since that has been impossible in Iraq as noted earlier, there can be no justice in fighting the war in Iraq.

[1] Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust War: A Moral Argument With Historical Illustrations. (New York: Basic Books, 2000, originally published in 1977), p. 20.
[2] See Oliver O’ Donovan, The Just War Revisited, (Cambridge, UK: Press Syndicate of University of Cambridge, 2003), especially chapter 1, for a discussion of the relationship between international law and its development to classical just war doctrine.
[3] For a review of the global evolution of just war doctrine and natural law theory, see Richard Tuck, The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and the International Order from Grotius to Kant, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), Terry Nardin (ed.), The Ethics of War and Peace: Religious and Secular Perspectives, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996), H. Patrick Glenn, Legal Traditions of the World, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), and Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars.
[4] On May 2, 2003, President Bush declared an end to hostilities and that the US had prevailed in its ‘Battle of Iraq’ in a speech on the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln, and, thus, began the on-going occupation of Iraq by the US-led ‘coalition of the willing’. For the purposes of this analysis, a third element of just war doctrine, jus post bello, or the justice after cessation of hostilities relating to the responsibilities of the occupying forces in reconstruction and security of the occupied country and its people during occupation, is not addressed here. It should be noted, however, to the extent that the Iraq war project had the express objective of ‘regime change’ and thus no status quo ante bellum would result, jus post bello issues are implied. See the discussion of just cause.
[5] O’Donovan wisely notes a caveat to thinking in terms of just and unjust wars. He notes, “it is very often supposed that just-war theory undertakes to validate or invalidate particular wars. That would be an impossible undertaking. History knows no just wars, as it knows of no just peoples…. The task of political ethics at this point is to provide as full a general account of the reconciling praxis of judgment as may be possible.” (p. 13)
[6] The six components used in this analysis were more consistent with the majority of modern writings on just war as well as those found in training manuals of the US army. (See Franklin Eric Wester, “Preemption and Just War: Considering the Case of Iraq”, in Parameters, (U.S. Army War College, December, 22, 2004, Vol. 34, Issue 4, pg. 20), found at
http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/parameters/04winter/wester.pdf [last accessed 5/1/2006]). Since the war in Iraq was predominantly a US-led effort, analysis in terms of just war as understood by the US army seems most appropriate.
[7] Gray, p. 40.
[8] Gray, pp. 294-302.
[9] The conceptual framework developed here is based on the authority continuum defined in Wester, p. 29.
[10] See Annex 2 for a list of all United Nations Security Council resolutions relating to Iraq over the period August 1990 through June 2004, which totaled 60 resolutions.
[11] “Iraq war illegal, says Annan “, BBC found on http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3661134.stm
[12] Vaughan Lowe “The Iraq Crisis: What Now?” in International and Comparative Law Quarterly, (Vol. 52, October 2003, pp. 859-871), p. 866.
[13] Wester, p. 27.
[14] McGoldrick, p. 68.
[15] Wester, p. 27.
[16] Arthur Schlesinger Jr., The Immorality of Preventive War, History News Network, George Mason University, August 2002, found at http://hnn.us/articles/924.html
[17] Gray, p. 33.
[18] See Hans Blix, Disarming Iraq. (New York: Pantheon Books, 2004) and Scott Ritter, Iraq Confidential: The Untold Story of the Intelligence Conspiracy to Undermine the UN and Overthrow Saddam Hussein, (New York: Nation Books, 2005).
[19]Declaration On Principles Of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations And Cooperation Among States In Accordance With The Charter Of The United Nations , General Assembly Resolution 2625, 1970. found at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/348/90/IMG/NR034890.pdf?OpenElement [last accessed 5/5/2006]
[20] Gray, p. 192.
[21] Dominic McGoldrick, From ‘9-11’ to the ‘Iraq War 2003’: International Law in an Age of Complexity, (Portland: Hart Publishing, 2004), p. 77-78.
[22] See Hans Blix, Disarming Iraq. (New York: Pantheon Books, 2004).
[23] See The 9/11 Commission Report, (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2004), Scott Ritter, Iraq Confidential, and James Risen, State of War: The Secret History of the CIA and The Bush Administration, (New York: Free Press, 2006).
[24] See Christine Gray, International Law and the Use of Force. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp.29-49
[25] ”The Responsibility To Protect”, Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, December 2001, (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001).
[26] Transcript of President Bush’s televised address on March 17, 2003, found on http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/03/17/sprj.irq.bush.transcript/
[27] See Hans Blix, Disarming Iraq, (New York: Pantheon Books, 2004) and Scott Ritter, Iraq Confidential: The Untold Story of the Intelligence Conspiracy o Undermine the UN and Overthrow Saddam Hussein, (New York: Nation Books, 2005).
[28] Michael Walzer, Arguing About War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), p. 153.
[29] O’Donovan in Just War Revisited, points to the fact that Aquinas made no such distinction. In fact, Aquinas pointed to three aspects of a just war: “the authority of a prince, a just cause, and a right intention.” (pp. 13-14). O’Donovan argues that the modern distinction between jus ad bellum and jus in bello “is a secondary casuistic distinction, not a load-bearing one.” (p. 15). See also John Finnis “The Ethics of War and Peace in the Catholic Natural Law Tradition”, p. 18 in Terry Nardin (ed.), 1996.

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Thursday, May 18, 2006

The Iraq War Stool

This is the third chapter of my paper on the 2003 Iraq war and its impact on international law and just war doctrine.

© 2005 justdahlia.blogspot.com
The War Stool

The 2003 US-led war on Iraq was mainly justified on the basis of the following three arguments:

1 - The US alleged that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and, was in flagrant contravention of numerous UN Security Council resolutions. The US and the UK argued that if the UN Charter regime was to maintain its legitimacy, the UN’s will must be upheld. In fact, it is argued that the invasion of 2003 is nothing other than a final battle in the war with Iraq which began in 1990 with Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.[1] Such a long-view of the conflict with Iraq is argued as evidence that the US did not wage a preventive war against Iraq at all, but, in fact, the 2003 invasion was a culmination of Iraq’s refusal to respect its cease-fire obligations. It should be noted, however, that such a long-view argument was not relied on by the Bush administration. Rather, the argument was always framed in the context of the threat the Iraqi regime posed as evidenced by its continual flaunting of its cease fire obligations and disregard for SCR.

2 - The US alleged that Saddam Hussein, the President of Iraq, had links with Al Qaeda and thus, coupled with its possession of WMD, posed a threat in that it might attempt to collaborate with Al Qaeda by providing access to such WMD. Accordingly, the US asserted that it had the right and obligation to defend itself against possible future terrorist attacks especially after the events of September 11, 2001. The US referred to the self-defense clause under the UN Charter Article 51 and UN Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373, addressing terrorism, as giving it such a right. This US view on self-defense was captured in its 2002 National Security Strategy[2] and is here referred to as the Bush doctrine of preventive war. The US also pointed to the UN sanctioned attack on Afghanistan in ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ as the basis for extending its ‘war on terrorism’ to Iraq. The US felt it was justified in demanding a ‘regime change’ as a political outcome to ensure that the threat of WMD falling into the hands of terrorist could be averted. The United Kingdom, it should be noted, did not rely on this justification.

3 - The government of Iraq was ruled by an irrational, thus undeterrable, tyrant who had committed crimes of aggression and crimes against humanity in Iraq, Kuwait and Iran. By bringing about ‘regime change’, the US-led coalition was ensuring long-term security to the world by eliminating one of its irrational actors. In addition, by bringing democracy to Iraq, the US was relieving the Iraqi people from suffering under a tyrant and allowing the Iraqi people to determine Iraq’s future. Thus the political objective of ‘regime change’ was also asserted as a valid humanitarian objective on the basis of an emerging norm of humanitarian intervention.

In summary, the events leading to the 2003 invasion of Iraq by the ‘coalition of the willing’ were framed, in the first instance, within international law and interpretations of the United Nations Security Council resolutions, and in the second instance on the Bush doctrine of preventive war. A third leg of the war stool rested on the concept of humanitarian intervention, an emerging norm of international law, which was constructed after the fact to provide balance to a teetering argument.

[1] See Franklin Eric Wester, “Preemption and Just War: Considering the Case of Iraq”, in Parameters, (U.S. Army War College, December, 22, 2004, Vol. 34, Issue 4, pg. 21-22), found at http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/parameters/04winter/wester.pdf , William H. Taft IV and Todd F. Buchwald, “Preemption, Iraq, and International Law, The American Journal of International Law, (Vol. 97, No. 3, Jul., 2003, p. 563), Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-9300%28200307%2997%3A3%3C557%3APIAIL%3E2.0.CO%3B2-1,
and John Yoo, “International Law and the War in Iraq”, The American Journal of International Law, (Vol. 97, No. 3, Jul., 2003, pp. 563-576). Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-9300%28200307%2997%3A3%3C563%3AILATWI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-4
[2] See The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002 found at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html [last accessed 3/18/2006]

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Wednesday, May 17, 2006

The 2003 Invasion of Iraq: "Those who can make you believe absurdities can make you commit atrocities." -- Voltaire

The following is the first part of paper I wrote on the impact of the 2003 invasion and occupation of Iraq on international law and just war doctrine. I will post the remaining parts of the paper over the coming days.

© 2005 justdahlia.blogspot.com
ABSTRACT
The US Iraq war project rested on a three-leg stool, namely that the 2003 invasion was a valid and necessary response to over 12 years of Iraqi intransigence, was necessary to prevent Iraq from threatening the world with its assumed weapons of mass destruction and its alliance with Al-Qaida, and was necessary to bring to an end the suffering of the Iraqi people and usher in the dawn of democracy in Iraq and eventually the Middle East region. This paper attempts to illustrate how justifications of the war in Iraq were constructed to appear legitimate, while an analysis of its claimed legitimacy suggests otherwise. It further suggests that if such claims emerge as acceptable practice, there may be severely altering implications for both international law and perceptions of just war.

"Those who can make you believe absurdities can make you commit atrocities." -- Voltaire

Overview
This paper focuses on the 2003 invasion of Iraq in the context of the ethical and legal parameters of a just war. The justifications cited by the 'coalition of the willing' for their 2003 invasion of Iraq were based in the first instance on international law and interpretations of the United Nations Security Council resolutions SCR), and in the second instance on the Bush[1] doctrine of preventive war. A third leg of the war stool rested on the concept of humanitarian intervention, which was later constructed to provide balance to a teetering argument. All three justifications can be analyzed from the perspective of just war doctrine. To limit any revisionist pitfalls, there is no attempt to discuss the veracity of the claims made to justify going to war, nor of the veracity of claims made about events likely to occur after going to war, merely that such claims were made as justification for war suffices for analysis, irrespective of their validity. It is the weight and construction of these justifications, not their validity, which is being assessed.

In so far as international law is the structure within which much of the water for going to war was placed, it is here proposed that such arguments are leaky, at best. The majority of international legal and relations thinkers reject such arguments wholesale. While the European members of the 'coalition of the willing' based much of their arguments on interpretations of SCR, the US focused on the doctrine of preventive war. In the case of war on Iraq, this argument rested oconvolutiontion of the idea of 'war on terrorism' and the fear of Iraqi (nonexistent) weapons of mass destruction. The Bush Administration 'preventive war' doctrine, as prosecuted in the invasion of Iraq it led in 2003, it is here argued, may be an expression of a political and hegemonic prerogative, however, it is not a legally recognized one, nor is it just. Finally, any attempt to justify the invasion of Iraq in 2003 on humanitarian grounds fails the test of legitimacy for two main reasons: firstly, due to the post-facto nature of the claim, and, secondly, due to the failure of the situation to rise to the level of humanitarian catastrophe.

Key to refuting the validity of the Bush war stool construction requires analysis of its explicit preventive war doctrine, as well as debunking justifications based, for example, on the myth of 'benevolent hegemony' and the militant outcomes of democratization policies as espoused by neoconservative thinkers and exercised by neoconservative practitioners. While most realist thinkers are in agreement that the Iraq war was not in the US national interest, realism is often turned to as the default explanatory approach in cases of war and peace due to its reliance on the importance of material indicators of might and means. Nevertheless, liberal theory is useful in understanding many of the arguments for going to war, such as democratic transformation, humanitarian intervention and benign hegemony. Finally, constructivist thinking offers an opportunity to question the role of discourse, identity, politics of fear, and even, it is here argued, Orientalism. Ultimately, the underpinning of the continual discourse on the 'legality', 'justice', and 'humanity' of the war is the importance of identity. It is here suggested that identity, the desire to be identified as 'legal', 'just', 'benign', 'freedom-loving', and 'humanitarian', while more readily understood within a social constructivist approach, is based on traditional notions of natural law, morality and just war. While, various schools of international relations thought serve to cast light on the events and affects of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the focus here will be an analysis of the war in terms of how the arguments for its legitimacy and ethics were socially constructed.

This paper contends that the 2003 invasion of Iraq is an illegal war of unjust cause, and, in turn, is being prosecuted unjustly. A just war rests on two elements: the justice of going to war (jus ad bellum), as well as the justice in prosecuting the war (jus in bello). With respect to the six elements of jus ad bellum, the US-led Iraq war seems to have applied only one adequately, namely a pronouncement of its intentions. Accordingly, the US war stool stands on wobbly legs and falls flat when assessed in terms of the criterion of a justly waged war. Jus in bello is based on the precepts of discrimination and proportionality, and the resulting tension between the two. Proportionality assumes, on balance, a positive outcome of the military imperative weighed against the costs, in terms of life and treasure. If the military imperative, or the cause of war, is seen to be unjust, there can be no net positive proportionality; a negative plus a negative serves only to sink us further into moral deficit.

Finally, the US-led invasion of Iraq has potential repercussions on customary international law and the principles of the UN Charter regime, while, at the same time, strengthening classical just war arguments. The greatest threat to customary international law lies in the international community not acting to refute the legitimacy of the political strategy expressed in both the 2002 and 2006 United States National Security Strategy. The US-led 2003 invasion of Iraq, a direct outcome of this strategy, has shaken the foundation of the international legal order, and unless international actors, states and organizations, address this backward-looking moral trajectory, there is a threat of the slippery-slope of reversion to unconstrained aggression by and between states, with the added dimension posed by the activities of illegitimate non-state actors. With respect to just war, the US-led invasion of Iraq serves to underscore and strengthen just war principles not only because it stands as such a stark illustration of injustice, but also because it proves that the morality and self-interest that underscores just war principles is validated.
[1] Unless otherwise specified, references to Bush or Bush administration apply to George W. Bush, and/43rdis administration, the 43rd President of the United States of America.

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